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Abstract 
 
Spontaneous mentalizing ability has been linked to symptoms severity in individuals with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD). Here we investigated whether in neurotypicals, higher levels of ASD 
symptomatology could also be linked to lower levels of spontaneous mentalizing, by comparing 
neurotypicals scoring high with those scoring low on the short Autism Spectrum Quotient. 
Participants watched movies during which they, and another agent, formed beliefs about 
the location of an object. These beliefs could influence reaction times (RT) to that object in the 
outcome phase. We expected participants with more ASD symptoms to show less spontaneous 
mentalizing, as reflected by a smaller effect of the other agent’s beliefs on RT patterns (the ToM 
index). In contrast, the effect of own beliefs on RTs, reflecting an egocentric bias, was expected to be 
larger in the high-scoring group. Results showed that groups differed in the effect of the agent’s 
beliefs; the ToM index was highly significant in the low-scoring group, while being absent in the high-
scoring group. No difference in egocentric bias was observed. These findings suggest that the 
relationship between levels of ASD symptomatology and spontaneous mentalizing is not only present 
in individuals with ASD, but also in the neurotypical population. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Theory-of-Mind (ToM), also referred to as mentalizing, is defined as the ability to attribute mental 
states (such as desires, beliefs or intentions) to oneself or others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; 
Wimmer and Perner, 1983). This ability is thought to underlie successful communication and social 
interaction. Because individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show deficits in exactly these 
capacities as a crucial part of their symptomatology (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
researchers have argued that ASD is characterized by a specific ToM deficit (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Rajendran and Mitchell, 2007). ToM ability has been investigated mostly with ‘false-belief 
tasks’: tasks in which an agent holds a false belief about the location of an object, because it was 
moved outside of the agent’s awareness. Participants are asked where the agent will search for this 
object, and when they correctly take into account the agent’s false belief, this is seen as successful 
ToM.  
Based on studies with these false-belief tasks, for a long time ToM was thought to develop 
around the age of four years (Wellman et al., 2001). However, more recently, when using different 
measures of mentalizing, such as eye-tracking, that do not require language or other higher cognitive 
skills, evidence for mentalizing was found in children much younger than 4 years (Onishi and 
Baillargeon, 2005; Senju et al., 2011; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007), for one study even 
as young as only seven months old (Kovács et al., 2010). For this reason, Apperly and Butterfill 
proposed the ‘two-systems account of mentalizing’ (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). They hypothesized 
that there are two mentalizing systems: one system entails an implicit or spontaneous form of 
mentalizing that develops early, and which is fast and inflexible; the other is a more explicit form of 
mentalizing developing at a later age, which is more cognitively demanding and slow, but also more 
flexible. It has been debated whether there are really two separate systems, or whether there is one 
core mentalizing system, which can either operate spontaneously or, under more controlled 
conditions, in combination with additional domain-general resources such as executive functioning 
and working memory (Carruthers, 2015). This latter view is supported by the recent finding that the 
brain regions underlying both forms of mentalizing overlap to a great extent (Bardi et al., 2016; Van 
Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013). Bardi et al. (2016) directly compared a spontaneous and an 
explicit version of a ToM task, which is the same task that we will apply in the current study. During 
this task, both spontaneous and explicit belief processing activated the medial prefrontal cortex and 
right temporo-parietal junction, two regions that have consistently shown to activate during explicit 
mentalizing (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
In any case, the existence of a spontaneous form of mentalizing might help to resolve the 
controversies surrounding the ‘ToM theory of ASD’. Soon after Baron-Cohen introduced the theory of 
a specific ToM deficit in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), it was already criticized because a relatively 
large amount of children and adults with ASD, especially high-functioning individuals, passed ToM 
tests (Bowler, 1992; Frith and Happé, 1994; Ozonoff et al., 1991). Since then, studies have shown 
that individuals with ASD can even succeed on more advanced ToM tasks (Scheeren et al., 2013; Spek 
et al., 2010). Still, they do show profound difficulties with everyday social communication and 
interaction. The argument would be that these individuals have a deficit in spontaneous mentalizing, 
but use compensatory strategies on explicit mentalizing tasks: in order to solve these tasks, they 
apply learnt rules and, if intact, their executive functioning skills, thus masking their reduced ability 
to mentalize spontaneously (Frith, 2004; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Pellicano, 2010). 
Several studies to date have indeed found support for impaired spontaneous mentalizing in 
people with ASD (Callenmark et al., 2013; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2013; Schuwerk et 
al., 2015; Senju, 2013; Senju et al., 2009). However, all of these studies have taken a categorical 
approach to ASD, comparing individuals with a diagnosis to neurotypical controls. More and more, 
researchers are taking a dimensional approach to developmental psychopathology (Hudziak et al., 
2007), arguing that individuals with a diagnosis are at the end of a continuum of traits existing in the 
general population, and that creating a categorical dichotomy will inevitably lead to the loss of 
potentially interesting information. Additionally, studying the non-clinical population has the 
advantage of reducing the influence of comorbidities present in the clinical population, such as 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, anxiety and depression in the case of ASD (Joshi et al., 2013; 
Mannion and Leader, 2013). These arguments have been recognized in the field of ASD specifically, 
where researchers acknowledge the importance of taking into account the presence of ASD-related 
behavior and personality traits in relatives of individuals with ASD (the broader autism phenotype or 
BAP) (Losh et al., 2011; Parr and Le Couteur, 2013), as well as in the neurotypical population more 
generally (Constantino, 2011; Constantino and Todd, 2003; Robertson and Simmons, 2013; Robinson 
et al., 2011).  
In this light, it would be interesting to investigate whether the link between spontaneous 
mentalizing ability and ASD symptomatology is also present in the neurotypical population. 
Therefore, with the current study we wanted to see if we would find differences in spontaneous 
mentalizing between people scoring high versus low on ASD symptomatology in the neurotypical 
population. In order to measure spontaneous mentalizing, we used the ‘Buzz Lightyear task’, a simple 
ball detection task based on the study by Kovács and colleagues (2010). Within this task, both the 
participants themselves and another agent (Buzz) form a belief about the location of a ball, but they 
are never asked about these beliefs explicitly. By recording reaction times to ball presence, which can 
be expected or unexpected for the participant and/or the other agent, one can measure the extent 
to which participants spontaneously tracked their own and other’s beliefs. A crucial measure in this 
task is the so-called ‘ToM index’: the difference between the condition in which neither participant 
nor Buzz expect the ball and that in which only the agent expects it: if RTs are faster only on the basis 
of what the other agent was expecting, this can be taken as evidence for spontaneous mentalizing. 
Recently, the Buzz Lightyear task has been validated both in neurotypical and ASD samples 
(Deschrijver et al., 2015; Nijhof et al., 2016), and in the fMRI study mentioned previously (Bardi et al., 
2016). Deschrijver et al. (2015), who applied the task in ASD, found that adults with high-functioning 
autism (HFA) had a significantly larger egocentric bias in spontaneous belief processing, reflecting an 
increased adherence to their own beliefs/expectations, as has also been reported in literature on 
explicit ToM (Begeer et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2005; Williams and Happé, 2009). In addition, the 
effect of the other agent’s belief, as reflected in the ToM index, was found to be correlated 
negatively with ASD symptomatology within the HFA group, indicating less spontaneous mentalizing 
with higher levels of symptomatology. This latter finding supports the hypothesis that the 
relationship between spontaneous mentalizing and ASD traits may be seen as a continuum rather 
than as a categorical distinction between people with and without an ASD diagnosis.  
In a recent study, we compared performance on an explicit and implicit spontaneous version 
of the Buzz Lightyear task in a neurotypical sample (Nijhof et al., 2016). RT patterns were similar for 
both versions, and the presence of the ToM index showed that participants indeed calculated the 
belief of another agent spontaneously (i.e., without being instructed to do so). In contrast to the 
study of Deschrijver et al. (2015), measures of ASD symptomatology in this study did not correlate 
with the size of the ToM index. This may, however, have been due to restricted variation in ASD 
symptoms within the neurotypicals included in the study. To address this, in the current study, we 
compared neurotypical participants with high and low extremes of ASD traits. This allows us to 
investigate whether the inverse relationship between spontaneous mentalizing and ASD traits is 
specific to the ASD population, or can be observed more broadly. The hypothesis would be that 
individuals scoring high on ASD symptoms show less spontaneous mentalizing than those scoring 
low, which would be indicative of a specific relationship between ASD traits and the ability to 
mentalize spontaneously. In other words, we expected the ToM index to be present in the low-
scoring group, and it to be decreased or absent in the high-scoring group. In addition, in line with the 
findings of Deschrijver et al. (2015), we expected to find a larger effect of own belief in our group 
scoring high on ASD measures, reflecting an egocentric bias.  
  
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were contacted through Experimetrix, the online system of Ghent University 
used to recruit students for experimental research. As part of this system, participants already filled 
out a large battery of short screening questionnaires, including the AQ-10 (Allison et al., 2012), a 
screener for autism symptomatology which consists of the 10 items with highest sensitivity and 
specificity of the 50-item Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Based on the 
online database of all AQ-10 scores (N = 427), a cut-off for the highest and lowest 20% of scores was 
set. Students with a score lower than 2 fell in the bottom 20% range and were recruited for the low-
scoring group, while students with a score of 5 or higher were recruited for the high-scoring group. 
This resulted in a group of 31 participants in the high AQ-10 range, and 29 participants in the group 
scoring low on the AQ-10. None of the participants in either group reported any history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders (including an ASD diagnosis). All participants gave informed 
consent prior to the study, which was approved by the local ethics committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University, and received a financial reward for their 
participation.  
Data of one participant in the low-scoring group were not saved correctly, so as a result, our 
final sample consisted of 31 participants in the ‘high-AQ’ group (7 male, 5 left-handed), and 28 
participants in the ‘low-AQ’ group (2 male, 2 left-handed). Mean group characteristics (including 
between-group comparisons) are displayed in Table 1.  
To check for the reliability of the AQ-10 score, during the experimental session participants 
also filled out the full AQ and the Social Responsiveness Scale for adults (SRS-A; Constantino and 
Gruber, 2002), which is another self-report screening questionnaire of ASD symptomatology, 
primarily addressing social responsiveness. The mean full AQ score across the two groups was 15.0 
(SD = 8.6), in line with previous findings in neurotypical populations (Ruzich et al., 2015). Mean SRS-A 
score was 41.1 (SD = 21.7), which is also comparable to previous findings (Ingersoll et al., 2011). In 
confirmation of the validity of the created groups, both full AQ and SRS-A score differed significantly 
between groups(see Table 1). In addition, a Spearman’s correlation revealed that both full AQ score 
and SRS-A score correlated with participants’ AQ-10 score across groups (full AQ: ρ = 0.60, p < .001; 
SRS-A: ρ = 0.52, p < .001). 
 
Table 1 
Group characteristics of the group scoring high and the group scoring low on the AQ-10, and their 
statistical comparisons between the two groups. 
 High-AQ group 
Mean (Standard 
deviation) 
Low-AQ group 
Mean (Standard 
deviation) 
Between-group 
comparison 
Age (years) 22.5 (4.5) 22.0 (2.6) t (57) = 0.50, p = .62 
Sex 7 male, 24 female 2 male, 26 female χ²(1) = 2.89, p = .09 
Full AQ score 20.0 (7.8) 9.7 (5.9) t (57) = 5.55, p < .001 
SRS-A score 51.5 (18.5) 30.1 (19.4) t (57) = 4.24, p < .001 
 
2.2 Task 
The implicit version of the recently developed Buzz Lightyear task (Bardi et al., 2016; Deschrijver 
et al., 2015; Nijhof et al., 2016), an adaptation of a similar task by Kovács et al. (2010), was used. For 
a detailed description of the task, see also Nijhof et al. (2016). During the Buzz Lightyear task, 
participants watched short videos (13,850 milliseconds; 720 by 420 pixels), presented on a black 
background using Presentation software (version 18.3). See supplementary material for an example 
video (note that the video may be of lower quality due to formatting). 
During these videos both the participants themselves, and another agent (Buzz Lightyear) formed 
a belief about the location of a ball, but they were never explicitly asked about these beliefs. The 
exact instructions were as follows (literal translation from Dutch): “You are asked to carry out a visual 
detection task. Instructions: Press the left response button (‘V’) when Buzz leaves the scene. Press 
the right response button (‘B’) as soon as possible only if the ball is present when the green occluder 
falls.” 
In each video, participants saw Buzz Lightyear placing a ball on a table, after which the ball 
started rolling around. First, the ball rolled behind a green occluder, and subsequently there were 
four possible continuations (Belief Formation phase, Figure 1): 
1. Resulting in the other agent (Buzz) holding a true belief (i.e., true in the eyes of the 
participant) about the ball being present behind the occluder (P+A+ condition: P = 
participant, A = agent, + = belief of presence, - = belief of absence). 
2. Resulting in the agent holding a true belief about the ball being absent, meaning the ball had 
rolled out of the scene instead of behind the occluder (P-A- condition).  
3. Resulting in the agent holding a false belief about the ball being present (P-A+ condition). 
4. Resulting in the agent holding a false belief about the ball being absent (P+A- condition). 
In each video, Buzz left the scene at some point (5000 ms after movie onset for condition P-A+, 7624 
ms after movie onset for condition P+A-, 9874 ms after movie onset for conditions P+A+ and P-A-). At 
this point participants had to press the left button (‘V’ on the keyboard), in order to assure they were 
paying attention to the ongoing video. After Buzz had left, the ball could either stay in the same 
location (P+A+ and P-A- condition), or change location, which lead to the agent holding a different 
belief than the participant (P+A- and P-A+ condition).  
At 12,694 ms in the video, the agent returns and at 13,250 ms, the occluder falls down. This 
is the Outcome phase (see Figure 1): on half of the trials, the ball is present (B+) behind the fallen 
occluder. On these trials, participants were instructed to press the right button (‘B’ on the keyboard) 
as quickly as possible. On the other half of the trials, where the ball is not present (B-), they should 
not press the button. Absence or presence of the ball is completely random and independent of the 
Belief Formation phase. In previous research with this task (Bardi et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 2016), 
debriefing questionnaires confirmed that participants were unaware of the manipulation of Buzz’ 
belief, and mentalizing can therefore indeed be considered spontaneous. 
In total, the task thus consists of 8 conditions: 2 (participant’s belief: present or absent; P+ or 
P-) x 2 (agent’s belief: present or absent; A+ or A-) x 2 (outcome: ball present or absent; B+ or B-), 
with reaction time data available for half of these conditions (i.e., the B+ conditions). 
Participants started with four practice trials, for which feedback was presented. After this, 
the actual task started and trials were presented without feedback, with an ITI of 1000 ms between 
movies. Each of the eight different movies was presented six times, resulting in 48 trials in total. 
These were presented randomly in two blocks of 24 trials with a short break in between. 
 
 Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the eight different conditions. P = participant, A = agent, + = 
expecting the ball, - = not expecting the ball. Eight conditions result from four possibilities in the 
Belief Formation phase (B + C, middle) and two possibilities (ball / no ball) in the Outcome phase (D, 
right). The Belief Formation phase and Outcome phase are independent from each other. In the first 
part of the movie (A), the ball rolls behind the occluder. In the second part (B), Buzz is present and 
the ball sometimes changes location. Between B and C, Buzz disappears and a left button response is 
required to indicate Buzz leaving the scene. In the third part (C), Buzz is absent and the ball 
sometimes changes location. In the last part (D; the Outcome phase), the occluder falls and the ball is 
present or not. Only when the ball is present, a right button response is required. (Adapted from 
Nijhof et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants filled out the AQ-10 questionnaire online, and came to the university for the 
experimental session. The Buzz Lightyear task was performed first, and took about 15 minutes. After 
this, two other short experimental tasks were carried out, which will be reported elsewhere. Finally, 
participants filled out the full AQ and SRS-A questionnaire. In total, the experimental session lasted 
approximately one hour per participant. 
 
2.4 Data analysis 
All statistical analyses were conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics 20 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 
USA). For the reaction time data, outliers of more than three standard deviations above or below the 
mean were removed per participant, as well as responses that were slower than 1000 ms or faster 
than 100 ms. A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the remaining correct reaction times 
(trials with a ball), with factors of Own Belief (present/absent), Other’s Belief (present/absent) and 
Group (high AQ, low AQ). In this way, we could investigate effects of spontaneous mentalizing as well 
as a possible egocentric bias, within and between groups. As we were particularly interested in the 
ToM index, planned comparisons were carried out between the crucial P-A+ and P-A- conditions. 
For all analyses, estimates of effect size were reported: partial eta-squared was reported for 
the ANOVA (0.01 = small, 0.06 = medium, 0.14 = large effect), and Cohen’s d (0.2 = small, 0.5 = 
medium, 0.8 = large effect) for t-tests (Cohen, 1988).  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Accuracy 
Accuracy was very high for both groups: in the low-AQ group, participants only made 0.9 
misses on average on the 24 trials with the ball, and 1.5 false alarms on the 24 trials without the ball. 
In the high-AQ group, these were 2.0 misses and 1.5 false alarms on average. Because of the small 
number of trials, this gives too little data to perform reliable group analyses. For this reason, no 
further analyses were performed on accuracy data.  
 
3.2 Reaction time 
Average RTs per condition are displayed per group in Figure 2. The ANOVA with factors Own 
Belief, Other’s Belief and Group revealed a main effect of Group (t(57) = 2.21, p = .03, d = 0.59): 
across conditions, average RT was higher in the group scoring high on AQ-10 (M = 352.4, SD = 9.2) 
than in the low-scoring group (M = 322.8, SD = 9.7). In addition, there was a main effect of Own 
Belief (F (1, 57) = 27.40, p < .001, η² = 0.33). This effect (the ‘egocentric bias’) can be explained as RTs 
being faster for those conditions in which the participants were expecting the ball (P+A+ and P+A-; 
mean RT = 327.2) than in conditions in which they were not (P-A+ and P-A-; mean RT = 348.0). This 
effect was not significantly different between groups (F (1, 57) = 0.01, p = .93, η² = 0.00).  
Also, there were two significant interaction effects. First, there was an interaction between 
Own and Other’s Belief (F (1, 57) = 14.65, p < .001, η² = 0.21). A planned comparison showed that RTs 
to P-A+ were significantly shorter than to P-A- (the ‘ToM index’, p = .001). Second, important for our 
hypothesis, Other’s Belief interacted with Group (F (1, 57) = 6.23, p = .02, η² = 0.10). Post hoc testing 
demonstrated that the effect of Other’s Belief was present in the low AQ-group (F (1, 27) = 5.49, p = 
.03, η² = 0.17), but absent in the high-AQ group (F (1, 30) = 1.52, p = .23, η² = 0.05). 
Finally, in order to test our main hypothesis, we evaluated the size of the ToM index (the 
difference between P-A- and P-A+) in both groups. The ToM index turned out to be highly significant 
in the low-AQ group (p = .001), while it was not present in the high-AQ group (p = .20). In the low-AQ 
group, it was 26.91 ms on average (SD = 38.87), and 9.64 in the high-AQ group (SD = 40.77). A direct 
comparison of the ToM index between groups showed a marginally significant difference (t (57) = -
1.66, p = .10, d = 0.44). Importantly, sensitivity analyses including sex as a covariate did not alter the 
significance of our findings. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average reaction times in milliseconds (+/- 1 standard deviation) per condition, per group. P 
= participant, A = agent, + = expecting the ball, - = not expecting the ball. The relevant comparisons 
are indicated in the figure legend. The asterisk shows that the planned comparison for the ToM index 
is significant in the low-AQ group (and not the high-AQ group). 
 4. Discussion 
 
Several recent studies have suggested that individuals with ASD show a specific deficit in 
spontaneous mentalizing (Callenmark et al., 2013; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2013; 
Schuwerk et al., 2015; Senju, 2013; Senju et al., 2009). To date, it was unclear whether this reflects a 
categorical distinction between people with an ASD diagnosis and neurotypicals. However, the 
results of the study by Deschrijver et al. (2015) suggested that ASD symptom severity contributes to 
the effect, as within their ASD group, individual differences in ASD severity were inversely correlated 
with the level of spontaneous mentalizing. This finding indicates that at least within the ASD 
population, individuals can vary in the extent to which they are impaired in spontaneous mentalizing, 
and that this is linked to the amount of ASD behavior and traits they exhibit. With the current study, 
we wanted to test whether the same would hold for the neurotypical population. 
Using the validated ‘Buzz Lightyear task’ we showed, for the first time, that differences in 
spontaneous belief processing were indeed related to self-report measures of ASD symptomatology 
in a neurotypical sample as well. Selecting neurotypical participants based on extreme scores on the 
AQ-10, we created groups of adults scoring high versus low on self-reported ASD traits. Replicating 
previous findings with the same task (Bardi et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Nijhof et al., 2016), 
we found that both the effect of participants’ own belief and the interaction of this effect with the 
other agent’s belief significantly influenced reaction times, with RTs being longest for the condition in 
which neither the participant nor Buzz was expecting the ball. The difference between this condition 
(P-A-) and the condition in which only Buzz was expecting the ball (P-A+) has been referred to as the 
ToM index in previous studies. Crucially, the ToM index was indeed present in our results, meaning 
that participants were significantly faster in responding to the ball in the condition where only Buzz 
expected the ball than where neither the participant nor Buzz expected the ball.  
Focusing on group differences, first of all, we found that participants in the high-AQ group 
were overall slower in detecting the ball, as indicated by a main group effect on RT. In clinical ASD 
samples, slower detection RTs have been observed in previous studies (Ciesielski et al., 1990; Schmitz 
et al., 2007), that have been associated with differences in selective attention and attention 
switching (Allen and Courchesne, 2001). Our findings indicate that slower detection is also evident in 
those neurotypicals who score high on ASD traits.  
More importantly though, in line with our hypotheses, groups differed significantly on the effect of 
the other agent’s belief on reaction time patterns, with the group scoring high on ASD 
symptomatology showing a decreased effect of the other agent’s belief on RTs. This is indicative of a 
link between spontaneous mentalizing and ASD symptomatology not only in the ASD population 
(Deschrijver et al., 2015), but also in the neurotypical population.  
Most previous studies using this paradigm focused at the ToM index to measure 
spontaneous mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Kovács et al., 2010; Nijhof et al., 
2016), which is argued to be the purest reflection of the effect of the other’s belief on RT. The 
argument is that if RTs are faster only on the basis of what the other agent was expecting, this can be 
taken as evidence for spontaneous mentalizing. Further testing in our study indeed showed that the 
ToM index was highly significant for the low-AQ group, while this effect was absent in the high-AQ 
group. It has to be noted though that there was a large inter-individual variability on this measure in 
both samples. Further studies are needed to address the issue of inter-individual variability and to 
replicate our findings in a larger sample, as this will increase power and may thus provide a more 
conclusive answer. 
One could argue that using a realistic human agent, rather than the cartoon figure Buzz, 
would provide a more ecologically valid representation of our everyday social interactions with 
others. However, previous studies with adults have validated the Buzz Lightyear task as a reliable 
measure of spontaneous mentalizing, both at the behavioral and at the neural level (Bardi et al., 
2016; Deschrijver et al., 2015; Nijhof et al., 2016), and our current findings add to this. Nevertheless, 
it would be an interesting question for future research whether using a more realistic other agent 
would give stronger effects. 
The results also revealed an effect of own beliefs on detection speed. However, no group 
difference was found for the effect of own belief, contrasting the finding by Deschrijver et al. (2015) 
of a larger egocentric bias in their ASD group. Possibly this could be taken to indicate that rather than 
a dimensional trait, the increased egocentric bias, reflecting a stronger-than-typical adherence to 
own beliefs/expectations, is a categorical distinction between individuals with and without ASD.  
In short, with our study we found evidence for a negative relationship between self-reported 
ASD symptoms and spontaneous mentalizing ability (ToM index) in a neurotypical sample, adding to 
similar findings in a sample of adults with high-functioning ASD (Deschrijver et al., 2015). These 
results once again emphasize the importance of studying cognitive functions that show a specific link 
to ASD-related behavior and traits in the neurotypical population as well. Firstly, this allows 
researchers to investigate these functions without the disadvantages of running clinical studies, and 
secondly, findings in the neurotypical population can inform researchers about the specificity of 
certain deficits in the ASD population. In fact, these arguments do not only hold for cognitive 
functions, but also for biological and neurological functions. Since spontaneous mentalizing has 
recently been linked to activity in the TPJ and mPFC (Bardi et al., 2016; Kovács et al., 2014), two 
regions typically involved in explicit mentalizing (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Schurz et al., 2014; Van 
Overwalle, 2009), it would be interesting to see whether activity in these regions is also related to 
measures of ASD symptomatology both within individuals with and without an ASD diagnosis. 
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